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INTRODUCTION
Ever since I picked up my first simple pop neuroscientific text, I have been
utterly fascinated with the notions of free-will, physiology, and reductionism.
Throughout high school all I wanted to read, and nothing more, was
neuroscientific and philosophical texts on how people are situated in terms of
their reality and their brain. Early on, I was entirely convinced that the only option
there was, in the terms of free-will, was deterministic reductionism, resulting in
the mere notion of free-will being almost laughable and incomprehensible to me.
Reading texts from only overly closed off neuroscientists definitely led to my
mindset for the years to come. Because of my fascination with our seeming lack
of free-will, I decided that I would love to be able to add on to the data that is
already present. This, in essence, was the entire reason I found myself within the
neuroscience program at Regis.
Though there was originally only fascination, there was also a sense of
urgency in this realm for a few different reasons. Firstly, I felt the need to attempt
to take away the stigma within the idea that we lack the option to choose.
Throughout high school even attempting to talk to people about the subject, or
just mentioning the mere notion, would result in people immediately walking
away or just laughing at the thought. Secondly, I felt the need to attempt to
approach the implications that come in the realm of justice, if we are to seriously
accept that we lack any sort of free-will. The first question that must be asked if
one is making the claim that we lack free-will is certainly how ought we to be
responsible (if we can) in any way for our actions. Following that, we have to ask
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what forms of justice we can implement in order to address ethical issues while
still recognizing the lack of choice. After majoring in neuroscience and moving
onto the second question, I was pushed into the realm of philosophy.
Though I was convinced that a common neuroscientific view on the topic
of free-will (overly deterministic reductionism) was comprehensive enough to
explain free-will (or a lack thereof), I was pushed to major in philosophy by an
urge to understand the differing views on the subject. These texts brought up
multiple points that made me start to doubt completely all of the ideas that
brought me to the Regis neuroscience program in general. Some of these ideas
were things such as emergence, the implications of being within a narrative,
phenomenological explorations and explanations, and even just the urgency with
which writers/philosophers approach the question itself.
Even though these texts have obviously not resolved my curiosity around
the subject, they have naturally opened the question itself. More specifically,
David Foster Wallace’s The Broom of the System has pushed me into the realm
of linguistics, narrative, and the notion of the individual being a construct within
someone else’s narrative. This thesis is a sort of culmination of mine and others’
thoughts around the subjects at hand, both meant to help clarify and explore
notions that are touched upon, in my opinion, far less often than they should be.
Therefore, this thesis aims to do a few things: 1) Adequately and fairly bring in
viewpoints from across the spectrum of multiple fields. 2) Showcase the
fruitfulness of bringing in fields that are normally seen as dichotomous on the
subject at hand. 3) Walk away with not an answer, but a more well informed
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viewpoint on the subject, leaving me more conscious of the implications of my
actions upon this world. 4) Finish with a question worth following up on after the
“conclusion” of my thesis.
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The Roles of the Constituents

The Role of a Neuron in a Narrative
Back in the early 1960’s,

The Role of a Word in a Narrative
Wittgenstein in his works

neuroscience graduate student Michael

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and

Gazzaniga met a man at California

the Philosophical Investigations

Institute of Technology who opened an

introduced two large ideas that play a

opportunity to a once in a lifetime

monumental role in how we can frame

chance for research. This man that

thoughts in a narrative, words in a

walked in, W.J., was the recipient of a

sentence, and our relation to both of

corpus callosotomy, a treatment that

these schemes. In Tractatus he lays

severs the nerve fibers between the

out seven propositions that, although

hemispheres of your brain in order to

different from his later works, still

hinder the spread of epileptic seizures,

provide insight regarding how we can

all the while confining information

look at the world. First he lays out that

hemispherically in the brain – leaving

the world is facts and then follows up

one hemisphere unable to communicate

with the notion that the logical picture

with the other half. When words or

of those facts resides in the realm of

letters were flashed to the right

thought (Biletzki). His second point,

hemisphere, W.J. claimed that he didn’t

that both Frege and Derrida point out

see anything while still remaining able to

as well, is that meaning is found only

mark and signify what he saw with his

in context, proposition, and use

left hand via telegraph key – a key that

(Philosophical Investigations §43;
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represents a specific image or symbol,

Tractatus 42; Foundations of

in particular super simple ones. This

Arithmetic 71; Derrida 114-115). Just

case study of W.J. was the catalyst of

as there is no self without the external,

Gazzaniga’s most ambitious project, that there is no meaning in a word without
of “the interpreter.” He found that the

the context of its use in a proposition.

right hemisphere is unable to label the

A good example of this is the

world with words upon recent

comparison between the two phrases

callostomy, whereas the left hemisphere

“Trieste is no Vienna,” and “Vienna is

is the origin of inner-narrative (Bower).

the capital of Austria” (Collected

Hence, this was the birth of the pop-

Papers 189). Although the same word

neuroscientific theory of the left

is employed, it is glaringly obvious that

hemisphere being analytic and the right

the same meaning is not evoked. Take

artistic (Connors). This inner-narrative

the case of “Trieste is no Vienna”: by

would attempt to combine the sensory

saying that Trieste is no Vienna, the

information coming from both fields of

commentator is not necessarily saying

vision while still rendering the participant

that the physical cities are not the

completely unconscious of what they are same, for that is obvious, instead this
being presented with to the right

person is calling to attention the

hemisphere. “For instance, one man had

greatness of Vienna (perchance a

a picture of a chicken claw flashed to his

sense of higher culture, different

left hemisphere and a picture of a snow

cultural norms) and saying that Trieste

scene presented to his right hemisphere. does not live up to this idea of Vienna.
From the ensuing selection of pictures,

In the second case, that of “Vienna is
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he correctly chose a shovel with his left

the capital of Austria” the person is

hand (controlled by the right

making a declarative claim regarding

hemisphere) and a chicken with his right

the social-political designation of

hand (controlled by the left hemisphere).

Vienna itself, and not necessarily

When asked to explain his choices, he

evoking conversation or implying

responded: ‘Oh, that's simple. The

anything regarding the culture and

chicken claw goes with the chicken, and

practices of the city. If one were to

you need a shovel to clean out the

represent the thought with symbols

chicken shed’” (Bower). What this gave

they couldn’t even utilize the same

rise to, outside of Gazzaniga’s career,

symbol for “Vienna” across the

was the importance of narrative – what

statements (Conant 234). With this

he later deemed as “the interpreter” - in

case of meaning in context and use, I

the explanation of how our brain

assert that it would be helpful (and

conveys information, and whether or not

ultimately necessary) to put one’s

this narrative arrives prior to, or following name or symbol under the same
neurophysiological process.
In order to give this research any

scrutiny.
These questions of meaning as

due justice, we cannot ignore the

use, and finding one’s self in need of a

processes behind the interpreter; we

larger narrative in order to have

must first look deeper at the neural level

identity in context are the questions

in order to gain a fuller picture of just

that plagued a young David Foster

what exactly is happening under the

Wallace as he was writing his first

hood to give rise to this “inner narrative.”

novel, The Broom of the System.
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As has been shown many times before,

These burning questions urged him to

mood states, perception, thoughts,

place the main character of the story,

religious beliefs, and even utilitarian

Lenore Beadsman, in the middle of a

proclivities have physiological correlates

reality that is nothing but

within the brain itself, which can even be

Wittgensteinian by nature – perfect to

manipulated by the use of magnetic

prod the notions of meaning and

fields (Borckardt; Persinger; Fumagalli).

construct.

Just as these tendencies and states

Lenore is a telephone

have physiological correlates, so does

switchboard operator from a family

the “inner narrative” that one hears in

with the most well-known last name in

the form of their stream of conscious

their town, East Corinth, Ohio (which

reality: the left hemisphere (Franks 35).

her father owns). As we will see, those

Now that there is a general idea of

that surround her predetermine

where this physiological correlate lies,

everything about her. She got her

we must look more closely at what is

name from her great-grandmother

actually happening physiologically.

“which is to say […] the person under

Neurons, the main cells of

whose aegis [she]’d first experienced

communication that lie within the brain,

chocolate, books, swing sets,

are composed of three basic parts - the

antimonies, pencil games, contract

dendrites (incoming communication), the bridge, the Desert…” and every other
soma (the cell body - powerhouse), and

formed aspect of her memorable life

the axon (outgoing communication).

(Wallace 31). Her boyfriend, Rick

These neurons usually communicate via

Vigorous, a sexually impotent
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specific chemicals: neurotransmitters.

publisher, makes up for his impotency

These neurotransmitters are released

by lying in bed besides Lenore and

once they are “signaled” to, and that

reading her stories that were sent in to

signal is in the form of an electrical

him or that he wrote (unbeknownst to

pulse, commonly known as the action

her) that he knows will move her

potential. Once this action potential, or

emotionally and affect her life

electrical signal, reaches the axon,

decisions (Wallace 27). These stories

calcium ions flow into the cell causing

range from problematic tales of an

the neurotransmitters at the end of the

obvious foil to Vigorous burning down

axon to release into the junction

the towns he lives in and the homes

between the axon and another cell’s

that he calls his own all the way to

dendritic tree. Once this chemical signal

stories of a man that falls in love with

jumps to another neuron the process

every woman he sees until he finally

propagates (Seung 42-44). This

connects with one - an extremely

jumping, signaling, and communicating

unattractive woman with a tree toad in

is exactly what the underlying

her neck. Luckily for Vigorous, he not

neurophysiological correlates consist of,

only has the bedroom to sculpt Lenore

lending us another way of analyzing

into the person he and everyone in the

what exactly is provoking this

town all desired, but she was also

“interpreter” that Gazzaniga puts forth.

easily convinced to see the same

Supposing that Gazzaniga’s

therapist that he does, Dr. Jay, who

comprehensive research regarding

holds his patient’s privacy with no

narrative in the human mind is correct,

regard (Wallace 61). Fittingly, he loves
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there are a few more questions and

to tell stories of Lenore to Vigorous,

paths that we must follow in order to get

cementing her reality into Vigorous’

a satisfactory explanation of “the

mind.

interpreter.” Firstly, we must look at what

In one session of talking to Dr.

makes these neurophysiological

Jay, Lenore finally breaks grounds on

processes arise and whether or not

the problems that her great-

these processes are direct equation with

grandmother imposed on her:

what we consider the human

“Suppose Gramma tells me really

consciousness and action, or whether

convincingly that all that really exists of

consciousness just bubbles out as

my life is what can be said about it?...it

afterthoughts attempting to validate the

seems like it’s not really like a life

actions of our own pre-determined mind,

that’s told, not lived; it’s just that the

notions and processes in order to feel a

living is the telling, that there’s nothing

sense of control in our lives. One way to

going on with me that isn’t either told

approach this inquisition is by looking at

or tellable, and if so, what’s the

previous experiments that have teased

difference, why live at all?... If there’s

out certain elements of

nothing to be said about me, what

neurophysiological activity (usually by

separates me from this lady in this

way of functional magnetic resonance

story Rick got who eats junk food and

imaging (fMRI)), subjective accounts of

gains weight and squashes her child in

consciousness, and, finally, a timing of

her sleep?... Gramma says she’s

the physical action itself in order to

going to show me how a life is words

analyze the role that each of these

and nothing else. Gramma says words
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mentioned measurements plays in

can kill and create. Everything”

producing said action.

(Wallace 119-120). Her great-

While there are many experiments

grandmother of the same name was

that approach this question in ways

an old understudy of Wittgenstein, who

similar to these described, most notably

continuously and confusingly stressed

Libet, Haynes, Fried, and Hallett, I will

to Lenore the question of what the

be primarily focusing on those of Libet,

most useful part of a broomstick is, the

Haynes, and Fried. In the 80’s, Libet

broomstick or the broom bristles:

recruited nine participants and

“Meaning as fundamentalness.

conducted 40 trials of requesting them to Fundamentalness as use. Meaning as
move their wrist at their own volition and
report back to him the time that they

use” (Wallace 150).
Great-grandmother Lenore was

“consciously decided” to do such. While

in a retirement home and all the while

this task was occurring, he was

running Lenore’s thoughts with her

recording their neurophysiological

antimonies and questions surrounding

activity with an electroencephalography

linguistics and meaning. Soon, feeling

machine. From this he was able to show

as if she had completely lost her

that their individual

“function” in society – leading to a loss

Bereitschaftspotentials, or readiness

of identity due to the Wittgensteinian

potentials, occurred (on average) an

notion of meaning as usage/function –

entire 850ms before the reported sense

great-grandmother Lenore escapes

of volition preceding wrist movement

her retirement facility with some sort of

(200ms before the actual muscle

“green book,” leaving behind her blue
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movement). Now, as most anyone could

and brown ones, alluding to some sort

point out, this study was flawed in many

of development and improvement

ways - particularly crude means of

upon Wittgenstein’s Blue and Brown

measurements - but it also certainly

Books with her own Green (Wallace

provided a stepping stone for future

40). All of this to say, Lenore’s entire

studies and inquiries on such the large

life consists of, is defined as, and is

question. Because of the advancement

even prescribed by words. Everything

of the technology surrounding fMRI,

that she is made up of is

people like Haynes had the opportunity

predetermined by these words,

to run a very similar experiment while

whether it is her name (that of her

collecting much more accurate and

great-grandmother’s), the town that

indicative data. Haynes informed the

she lives in (that of her father’s), her

participants that they have the option of

experiences (imposed upon by her

pressing either the button in their left

great-grandmother), or even the

hand, or their right, at whichever time

“problems” that she faces (forced upon

they choose. These participants were in

her by Vigorous) that dictates that she

an fMRI scanner throughout the entirety

attend a therapist; nothing in Lenore’s

of the experiment, and it was found that

life is of her own construction, but

a full seven seconds before the

instead prescribed upon by sources

participants pushed either button,

exterior to her, forcing this construct

activity was seen in their Broadmann’s

into a purely Wittgensteinian world.

Area 10, a region commonly associated

With that being said, in order to

with higher-level planning. The most

understand a world of words, one that
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monumental part of this study was not

can seemingly dictate the running

only that Haynes could tell a full seven

narrative of one’s life, one must always

seconds before these participants when

go back to the starting block: the word.

they were going to “randomly” press a

In many works of fiction there is a

button, but he also could determine, with

certain fixation around being able to

significantly more accuracy than random

control the usage of words, dictating

guessing or odds would produce, which

what exactly the meaning behind

hand they were going to press the

someone’s name in a social setting is,

button with. Once the fMRI gave clear

telling stories about others, and even

images of the more active areas of the

highlighting the truth behind fiction; but

brain while the participant was making

where exactly does this fixation take

the decision of which hand to press the

us and what does it tell us? Whether it

button with, neuroscientist Itzhak Fried

is Humbert Humbert’s exclamation of

utilized these clear images and

his Lolita (denoting a very obvious

implanted an electrode in said areas

although seemingly immaterial

within an epileptic population. Able to

relationship of ownership and control)

record single neuron action potentials,

or Vigorous’ muttering of “So you do

Fried was able to determine which hand

love me, then. I do have you, after

they were going to use at an astounding

all…Some words have to be explicitly

80% accuracy (Libet; Smith).

uttered, Lenore…Some words can

Although these exciting results may literally make things real” after painting
seem like they necessitate painting the

a caricature of her life, I assert that this

participant into the realm of a

notion, this necessary narrative, is one
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deterministic machine, there are many

of attempted and usually successful

scientists arguing that the narrative,

imposed control. Reducing a character

which was mentioned earlier on, is

to a linguistic construct, to a single

present in our minds at all times and can

word, which you dictate, brings to mind

indeed affect physiological events

Wittgenstein’s notion of meaning as

occurring in our brains. Michael

use. Using a person’s name in a

Gazzaniga provides us with an account

narrative, even one that you concoct or

that could potentially deal with this

control, imparts meaning on this

question: “[f]irst—and this has to do with

person that you are using as a

the very nature of brain-enabled

construct. Just as Lenore’s great-

conscious experience itself—we humans grandmother stressed that the
enjoy mental states that arise from our

essence of the broom could be any

underlying neuronal, cell-to-cell

aspect of it depending on the function

interactions. Mental states do not exist

of it, to utilize someone in a narrative

without those interactions. At the same

in which they are conveyed as a two-

time, they cannot be defined or

dimensional construct is nothing short

understood by knowing only the cellular

of forcing them into an instrumental

interactions. Mental states that emerge

role, a role that they have no control

from our neural actions do constrain the

over and that is seemingly at the

very brain activity that gave rise to them.

mercy of the narrator, not the world

Mental states such as beliefs, thoughts,

around them. Jay provides a perfect

and desires all arise from brain activity

example of this while describing to

and in turn can and do influence our

Vigorous Lenore’s new lover: “My area
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decisions to act one way or another.
Ultimately, these interactions will

is the fact that Lang constructs a
Lenore, constructs her the way we

only be understood with a new

each of course construct, impose our

vocabulary that captures the fact that

frameworks of perception and

two different layers of stuff are

understanding on…[s]he is trapped

interacting in such a way that existing

and two-dimensional and unreal…Ah,

alone animates neither” (Gazzaniga

but then he puts marks, initials, his

167-168). Gazzaniga asserts that we

initials on her, in her” (Wallace 343-

need an entirely new vocabulary in order 344).
to describe these mental states that

Although the notion of a top-

have both top-down and bottom up

down narrative forcing a role onto a

components and constraints. John

single being is easily taken up, we

Doyle, a teacher at Caltech, notes in

must ask ourselves what the bottom-

alliance with Gazzaniga that what we

up role of the person has on that

first need to shirk in order to understand

overarching narrative – if anything –

this problem, is the urge to utilize

and if that role has enough strength in

Aristotelian categories, or more simply

order to alter the overarching narrative,

put - the urge to use language of

enough to free the individual character

causation (Gazzaniga 168). This

from being forced into a construct, a 2-

language of causation is one that is very

dimensional caricature. There are

near and dear to us. The very fact that

multiple relationships at play in this

this is the case raises the problem of

paradigm and they seemingly reinforce

free-will itself, where most

a feedback loop: the relationship
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neuroscientists stake their claim that

between the actions of the individual

free-will is in fact an illusion. Gazzaniga

and the role that they play in the

gets at this problem with some very

narrative (for example, any move that

convincing scenarios, calling into

Lolita makes early in the novel

question conscious volition: “As a

reinforces the sexual hue that HH sees

person is walking, the sensory inputs

them in), the actions of the narrative

from the visual and auditory systems go

and how they play with the individual

to the thalamus, a type of relay station.

(when one is told that they are a failure

Then the impulses are sent to the

their entire life, they are more prone to

processing areas in the cortex and then

be more critical on even their

relayed to the frontal cortex. There they

successes than others), and the words

are integrated with other higher mental

of the narrative and how they play with

processes and perhaps the information

the construct of the individual (when

makes it into the stream of

describing a person to a stranger, the

consciousness, which is when a person

narrative of that person being

becomes consciously aware of the

described is the only source of the

information (there is a snake!). In the

construct of this person) (Nabokov). I

case of the rattler, memory then kicks in

propose that the most effective way to

the information that rattlesnakes are

deal with these interactions is to

poisonous and what the consequences

analyze the power relationships that

of a rattlesnake bite are, and I make a

are created in between characters in a

decision (I don’t want it to bite me),

narrative; more specifically, which

quickly calculate how close I am to the

interrelationship has the most dictating
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snake and its striking distance, and

power, which one can override all of

answer a question: Do I need to change

the others in the end.

my current direction, and speed? Yes, I

When the individual (the subject

should move back. A command is sent

of a proposed narrative) interacts with

to put the muscles into gear and then do

the narrative (or more aptly the one

it. All this processing takes a long time,

telling the narrative) there is a strong

up to a second or two, and I could have

area of disconnect. Say the individual

been bitten while I was still in the midst

acts against the proposed narrative;

of it. Luckily, however, all that doesn’t

there is the strong possibility that they

have to occur” (Gazzaniga 76). The

will do nothing but evoke a strong

brain instead takes a shortcut through

reaction, an attempt at lessening the

the amygdala and the conflation of this

dissonance present. “Whatever

neurophysiological event is the

evolution this or that popular character

invocation of the interpreter – all the

has gone through between the book

while lacking the need of a micro-

covers, his fate is fixed in our minds,

interpreter. We speak of and experience

and, similarly, we expect our friends to

all of these situations as reflexes and as

follow this or that logical and

if there is a cause and an event, but this

conventional pattern we have fixed for

is where we are clearly lacking in our

them. Thus X will never compose the

vocabulary.

immortal music that would clash with

Before we can start looking into

the second rate symphonies he has

how exactly our vocabulary is the thing

accustomed us to. Y will never commit

that is holding us back, we must first

murder. Under no circumstances can Z
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look at a phenomena termed

ever betray us” (Nabokov 265).

“emergence,” a concept that has been

Therefore, the effect that this

discussed since the time of Aristotle

counterintuitive action has on the

(Aristotle). “Emergence is when micro-

narrative as a whole can almost only

level complex systems that are far from

be seen as counteractive to the notion

equilibrium (thus allowing for the

of an individual “correcting” their own

amplification of random events) self-

narrative. Let’s say the individual acts

organize (creative, self-generated,

in agreement with the notion that the

adaptability-seeking behavior) into new

narrative propagates; the problem here

structures, with new properties that

is that of causation. It is not known

previously did not exist, to form a new

whether the action is the cause of the

level of organization on the macro level”

narrative or the narrative the cause of

potentially giving rise to what we

the action, leaving this notion

perceive of as the mind (Gazzaniga

incredibly ambiguous; for example,

195). Just as a steady collection of cars

when Lolita sits on HH’s lap in a

in a city can give rise to an instance of a

sexual manner, is it because this is the

traffic jam, which is almost self

actual act that she chooses to do and

sustaining and necessarily has

the connotation that she wishes it to

completely different characteristics than

have, or it is because the narrative

the cars themselves, so purportedly can

forces this hue on the act of Lolita?

(purportedly) individual neurons give rise Although this notion is ambiguous,
to a mental state, an interpreter, or a

there are still insights to be gained

consciousness, that has completely

within the thought of self-fulfilling
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different characteristics and properties
than the neurons themselves. If this

prophecy.
The strongest of the three

statement is true, it may be feasible that

interactions though, I propose, is that

this account of emergence provides us a

of the metaphysical interaction of the

way out of the problem that is the

narrative on the construct of the

interaction of the mental state downward

individual. Though a construct (usually

on the neuronal makeup. Gazzaniga’s

defined as an idea formed in people’s

argument from analogy is the only thing

mind) of a person can be formed in the

that allows him to hang onto this hope:

mind of said person themselves, the

“What has become obvious to most

most predominant usage of the identity

physicists […] is that at different levels of construct lies outside of the individual’s
structure, there are different types of

mind. Usually, this identity is only to be

organization with completely different

formed and utilized by someone that is

types of interactions governed by

not that person, leaving the person

different laws, and one emerges from

himself or herself without control over

the other but does not emerge

this construct. When one is told a story

predictably. This is even true for

about (John did this, John did that)

something as basic as water turning to

there is no locus of volition, the

ice, as physicist Robert Laughlin has

individual being told about and

pointed out: Ice has so far been found to

constructed is nothing but a victim of

have eleven distinct crystalline phases,

the language being used in the

but none of them were predicted by first

narrative being provided about them

principles!” (Gazzaniga 197). What his

and its purposes for the teller. Meaning
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provocation of the imagery of water does as use.
to the problem of top-down causation is

Although this is seemingly the

nothing short of a Texas sharp-shooter

case, I assert that there is a larger

fallacy1. By stressing the similarities of a

structure outside of the narrative that

neuron giving rise to the mental state

gives rise to a certain feedback loop,

and water giving rise to ice (even

which has the potential to have the

different and unpredictable forms of ice)

most power over both the narrative

he is pulling the reader’s attention away

and the subject of the narrative. The

from the problematic notion that, yes,

narrative world in which this narrative,

these both give rise to one another, but

by necessity, must take place provides

if we are looking at the top-down

an entirely new layer, which we must

causation we are talking about two

disassemble in order to understand the

completely different things. To say that

relationships at play below it. Just as a

the ice can affect the water that

word must be used in a certain context

constitutes it is a more logical and

in order to be sensible, so must the

intuitive statement for it follows that

narrative. This meta-narrative that

material can indeed affect material, but

incases the individual narrative can

to stress that a mental state can affect

take many forms in literature. In some

the underlying neurological mechanisms

cases it can almost simply be boiled

is asserting something much more

down to the setting that surrounds the

dangerous and problematic: the

narrative - take the post-Hiroshima

immaterial can affect the material. Now,

setting that dictates the endeavors and

1 The Texas sharp-shooter fallacy is the act ignoring the differences inherent in data in order to stress similarities; e.g. a Texan
shooting the side of a barn and painting a target over the most prevalent cluster of bullet holes.
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the evident rejoinder would most likely

drives of John/Jonah in Vonnegut’s

be that “well, yeah, but the main point of

Cat’s Cradle, or even just the effect of

the phenomena of emergence is that it

the global political climate of southern

DOES have the ability to change the

France for Humbert Humbert in Lolita

properties in the process.” This is

(Vonnegut, Nabokov). But even more

seemingly problematic once one takes

abstracted than the setting itself, there

heed to the fact that we are only able to

are the social practices that surround

account for mental states in subjective

the narrative – such as the subversive

explanations and neurological activity

nature of San Lorenzo towards

underlying them. Though this notion

Bokononism in Cat’s Cradle, which

might at first seem troublesome, I assert

frames and formulates Jonah’s initial

that we must look to other pertinent

reaction to boko-maru (the religious

structures in society that might either

act of two people pressing the naked

resolve this discrepancy, or at least help

soles of their feet together, in order to

to parse out the details of it, in order to,

evoke mingled and joint awareness

hopefully, start to be able to clearly see

and enlightenment) (Vonnegut). These

the feedback loops that are present in

various contexts must dictate and

the brain and the world surrounding it.

interact with the underlying narrative in

Although it is conceptually simple
to start with the neuron and go up, we

ways that necessitate a change the
nature of the narrative itself.

must not forget the input that must occur

This feedback loop that I am

in order to result in these neurons firing.

proposing seems to raise one large

At every instant we, as conscious

question: is it possible (or even
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beings, are being bombarded with

sensible/justifiable) to make logical a

perceptions and even psychological

single narrative in the absence of the

imperatives from the society and social

other narratives within the feedback

structures that inevitably surround us.

loop? Let us explore a few examples in

Though some of these are material,

order to further understand this

architectural structures, pathways, and

question (see figure 1). First, we will

public transport, there are also many

take a look at a meta-narrative that

immaterial structures that we must

seemingly surrounds every

interact with in every instant. Some of

relationship and other narrative in

these immaterial structures, while still

Lolita: the setting of the scene. The

giving rise to material structures, consist

surrounding space is a necessary

of ideological biases imposed by culture,

realm in which every other narrative

social norms, laws, and even

must occur. From here we will then

preconceptions. All of these immaterial

look at the invisible structures that feed

structures come loaded into the

into the narratives that we are

perception of the world around us - how

analyzing. Some of these invisible

we experience our surroundings as a

structures include simple things such

whole. These perceptions, in turn, are

as social norms, and more complex

necessarily substrates of a larger

things such as the way that romance

feedback loop, which includes the neural with a younger girl is treated and
level in our brains.
What exactly would this feedback
loop look like though, and how does it

therefore tinted to those that have any
connection to it. These social norms
and expectations feed into the actions
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provide enough response in order to

of Lolita (the person), Humbert

amend its own neural substrates? Take

Humbert (HH), and the narrative that

a normal situation for an example: you

HH provides us of Lolita (the

are sitting at a coffee shop. Continuously construct).
you are receiving a stream of

For example, whenever HH

perception, but with that perception

drops by Lolita’s house (the

comes an inseparable amount of

surrounding space and context) on

information regarding the social situation

Hunter Road to find her pregnant and

surrounding you, not only the

married, there are multiple narratives

perceivable information but also the

present that are forcing him to act the

underlying information. Every action that

way he does. Knowing that he cannot

you take from that moment on feeds

personify Lolita as his early sex-slave

right back into this loop; as soon as you

to her new husband, HH takes on the

commit to an action you are forced to

role of her father; while this isn’t

see this action within the social

necessarily a false role, it is one that is

information that is underlying the

certainly undermined by the master

situation, completely changing the

role that he more predominately

possible perception of even your own

personifies himself with. It wasn’t until

action.

Dick, “Dolly’s” husband left the room

Though we can further our

that HH could resume the role of

understanding of these perceptions and

jealous ex-lover and force out of Lolita

how our brains respond to the

the name of the lover that took her

underlying information that is contained

away from him: Quilty (Nabokov 274-
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in every situation by studying further the

277). Within the social norms present

lower substituents in the brain, I assert

in this situation, there is the

that with the complication of emergence

demonstration that HH cannot even

we must not only take the more

view Lolita as the same construct, but

prevalent bottom-up notion of constraint

instead deems her Dolly. Within

into account, but also the potential top-

different context, there is inherently

down/bottom-up interactions that are

different meaning. With these

happening behind the scenes. Though

structures in mind, we can now turn

some of these complicated interactions

our attention to a single example of the

are undoubtedly being looked into in

young Lolita’s (the person’s) actions

very important ways (such as the study

and how the narrative that HH

of the effect of abstract belief systems

provides affects them. These actions

on readiness potentials and perception

feed into HH’s narrative, but they do so

of voluntary behavior) I assert that we

in a very peculiar way; while they

must also look into the

might be innocent in nature – childish

phenomenological reality of the

acts and movements – they are still

consciousness at an individual level to

tinged by the nature of HH’s narrative

further understand these interactions in

itself, and therefore they create a sort

a more holistic way (Rigoni et al.).

of feedback loop, which changes the
perceived nature of these actions all
together. “I was sitting, Humbert the
Hoarse put his arm around her in a
miserable imitation of blood-
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relationship; and still studying,
somewhat shortsightedly, the piece of
paper she held, my innocent little
visitor slowly sank to a half-sitting
position upon my knee. Her adorable
profile, parted lips, warm hair were
some three inches from my bared
eyetooth…All at once, I knew I could
kiss her” (Nabokov 48). Now, with
these actions tinted and hued in the
favor of HH’s running narrative (thanks
to cognitive bias), there is the
possibility for HH to create an entirely
new Lolita, the construct of Lolita.
Although the narrative itself can
have an effect on the nature of Lolita’s
actions, it seems like Lolita (the
construct) is the only connection and
entity that is created by a single
stream and unable to affect any other
relationship or narrative. The actions
are painted prior to perception for HH,
therefore when this narrative creates in
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his mind the construct of Lolita, there
is no hand in the game but his own
narrative. “In point of fact, there might
have been no Lolita at all had I not
loved…[w]hat I had madly possessed
was not she, but my own creation,
another, fanciful Lolita – perhaps,
more real that Lolita; overlapping,
encasing her; floating between me and
her, and having no will, no
consciousness – indeed, no life of her
own” (Nabokov 9, 62).
We must not forget, though, that
in the outcome of this story no one is
able to escape these top-down
constraints of narratives, not even HH.
HH notes this towards the very end of
his own story: “This, I said to myself,
was the end of the ingenious play
staged for me by Quilty” (Nabokov
305). Now that we have a certain idea
of what a top-down narrative can do
and necessarily does do to a
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construct, we must in turn ask what the
narrative can do for an individual and
whether or not there is a significant
difference between the two, and how
we ought to perceive our own
narratives that gives rise to these
constructs.
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Convergence

“For while the passage of light into the brain is an instance of standard physical
causation, the gaze that looks out most certainly is not” (Tallis).

Commonly pitted against each other instead of used together in order to
augment the implications that each realm holds, the neuroscientific and linguistic
accounts of narrative and free-will actually have quite a lot in common and can
build upon each other. As referenced above, Tallis makes the assertion that
although there is the presence of the standard account of physical causation
within the act of perception and the brain, there is still a disconnect in-between
that and the way that the mind colors the perception itself. From this assertion we
must be pushed to ask a series of questions: Does this gaze account for the
human will? Does this gaze color perception in ways that have causal
implications that can be mapped on reality?
Though Nietzsche’s view of the will and consciousness is a topic of much
debate, it certainly serves as a useful stepping-stone in comprehending what we
are dealing with in terms of narrative and will. Many have spent time arguing that
Nietzsche’s will is that of an epiphenomenal meta-effect, that is, lacking any sort
of causal efficacy in terms of will (Leiter). The more thorough and seemingly
logically consistent reading of Nietzsche’s works yields an entirely different
picture though; Nietzsche’s will is that of an incremental and microscopic nature.
What Nietzsche asserts, which is seemingly in line with Tallis’ view of the gaze, is
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that although the faculty of consciousness (the “I” willing) is worth critique, the
causal efficacy of it is not.
With the assertion that “what really arouses indignation against suffering is
not suffering as such but really the meaningless of suffering,” Nietzsche is
seemingly making the claim that what moves us “is not sensation as such, but
sensation coupled with a thought about its meaning” (On the Genealogy of
Morality II.7 & Katsafanas 202). So, following the common conception of a
feedback loop, the implications follow that any perception (“passage of light into
the brain”) is meaningless and has no value that can be mapped upon it until it
reaches the realm of the consciousness, which in turn can create the personal
narrative (an act of categorization, an evocation of meaning, “the gaze that looks
out”) that can run alongside the action, and provide meaning. There are two
helpful examples that Katsafanas gives us in order to more easily understand this
notion. The first example is that of exercise. Exercise, to the extent that it brings
pain and tiredness to people, is something that is contingent upon the nature of
the person’s consciousness that it is colored. Some people love the pain and
anguish so much that it becomes an addiction, whereas others cannot even
stand the thought of it. The second example provided is sex outside of marriage
in religious populations and non-religious populations. The same physical act is
committed, yet one’s consciousness is able to color the act in a way that it haunts
the person with guilt, whereas the other can see it as an act of pure joy. But what
are the constituents of this consciousness and what can affect it?
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Though Nietzsche argues that unconsciousness is a realm of
nonconceptually articulated content, he still supports the notion that such has an
effect on the conscious states that can arise. If one has an unconscious state
that is of a certain mental-affect, this, in essence, changes the perception of the
conscious state itself. Therefore, in order to start willing and start changing the
conceptual content that arises within the conscious state, we must first attack the
unconscious. This is where Nietzsche’s case for incremental willing takes form.

Motives causally impact the conscious experiences
related to willing, which in turn causally influence the
motives; out of this process, we get a potentially
reconfigured set of motives, with new motivational
propensities. This new set of motives might again
causally influence the conscious experiences related
to willing and so on. Action results from all of this.
(Katsafanas 206)

So, this entails that “we have to learn to think differently – in order at last,
perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently” (Daybreak 103). I
will return to my previous examples of sex and exercise in order to more clearly
explain this quote. If we are to “learn to think differently… in order … to feel
differently” in the realm of exercise, we could instead focus on the fact that we
are bettering ourselves and our bodies, have this constantly in our mind, and
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start to associate the pain brought about by extreme exercise to this bettering.
Once this association is steadily in place, the pain will be only a feeling of
bettering and will be felt and perceived in a completely different way. The sex
example also works accordingly: Take for example a young fundamentalist that
holds pre-marital sex as one of the largest sins that one can commit in their
young lives. Say they slip up and find themselves in a situation in which they are
partaking in such the activity. This partaking will be filled with all sorts of feelings
of remorse and regret, not to mention the lasting guilt that will follow the activity.
Now, picture the same person a year later after they shirked their radical faith. As
long as there are no lasting ties of religious guilt, this activity would play out
completely differently. The person would partake in the activity, feel differently
during it, perceive differently during it, and, in turn, be different during it. It is
important to note though, that these transformations of “being” differently are not
of immediate nature, they are instead long incremental processes that take a lot
of conscious effort; the once fundamentalist person does not just shake all
notions of religious guilt in one conscious thought, but instead works on it for long
periods of time, only to finally be and feel different. This is the nature of the
incremental will – which, as we will see, runs parallel to our contemporary notions
of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, yet seemingly happens at a more individual and
self-conscious level.
Though the notion of an incremental will is a complicated one, we must be
pushed to put this in conversation with what we are able to do with the narratives
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that we provide ourselves and others. Nietzsche, yet again, gives us a way to
look at the power that is inherently present within narrative and construct:

Only as creators! – This has given me the greatest
trouble and still does: to realize that what things are
called is incomparably more important than what they
are. The reputation, name and appearance, the usual
measure and weight of a thing, what it counts for –
originally almost always wrong and arbitrary, thrown
over things like a dress and altogether foreign to their
nature and even to their skin – all this grows from
generation unto generation, merely because people
believe in it, until it gradually grows to be part of the
thing and turns into its very body. (The Gay Science
213)

What this aphorism forces us to recall are a few things already discussed:
Lenore’s conception and struggle as a linguistic construct, Wittgenstein’s
meaning as use, the sometimes problematic narrative that our own brain
provides in order to explain situations that occur outside of us, the power of our
own incremental will in destroying and creating constructs, and culture’s
incremental will in destroying and creating the same things. This ability to will a
meaning (in even a single usage) and have it “gradually grow to be part of the
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thing and turn into its very body,” certainly carries ethical implication with our
capacity to will a narrative or even the notion of an individual’s psyche; but, what
exactly must we be held responsible for in the mere act of concocting narratives
on a daily basis? Amongst many others, Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, has
touched on this notion:

What if, however, humans exceed animals in their
capacity for violence precisely because they speak?
As Hegel was already well aware, there is something
violent in the very symbolisation of a thing, which
equals its mortification. This violence operates at
multiple levels. Language simplifies the designated
thing, reducing it to a single feature. It dismembers
the thing, destroys its organic unity, treating its parts
and properties as autonomous. It inserts the thing into
a field of meaning which is ultimately external to it.
When we name gold “gold,” we violently extract a
metal from its natural texture, investing into it our
dreams of wealth, power, spiritual purity, and so on,
which have nothing whatsoever to do with the
immediate reality of gold. (Zizek 52)
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The ongoing example of Lolita can help clarify Zizek’s point. Just as
language simplifies, destroys organic unity, and treats one aspect of an intricate
thing with parts and properties as autonomous, HH reduces and simplifies Lolita
into a single entity, a two-dimensional character (reminiscent of Lenore), that of a
prepubescent sex object. The entire organic unity of Lolita, a normal and
innocent child living out her life and acting as any child would, is stripped and in
turn made into the autonomous sexual entity that HH chooses. Akin to how our
usage of gold as describing an earth metal has steadily turned into a word filled
with notions of greed, power-struggle, and other completely irrelevant and tainted
attributes, so has HH’s usage of Lolita’s name and construct within the narrative
of his own desire changed from person to sexual object. Whenever the thought of
Lolita comes to mind, it must be put into reference with this field of meaning that
encompasses the non-organic simplified “Lolita.” In doing this, as described in
the figure below, every action Lolita makes must be misconstrued in order to fit
within this pre-existing framework and field of meaning. The real nature of the
childish Lolita is violently taken from her and instead imposed upon with HH’s
sexual desires, just as humans impose irrelevant ideas into the element of gold.
This is showcased very clearly even on the first page of the novel itself which
was referenced earlier on: “She was Lo, plain Lo, in the morning, standing four
feet ten in one sock. She was Lola in slacks. She was Dolly at school. She was
Dolores on the dotted line. But in my arms she was always Lolita … In point of
fact, there might have been no Lolita at all had I not loved, one summer, a certain
initial girl-child” (Nabokov 9). As we can see with both the case of gold and the
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case of Lolita, there is something violent and seemingly problematic surrounding
the nature of our own consciousness and creation of language. We must be
pushed to ask though, what are the implications? If this is indeed the nature of
language, and in turn the nature of the brain, why does it matter if we can’t even
avoid it? Before going into the more inherently violent aspects of language, it
would be worthwhile to look at some of the better sides.
Though Nietzsche is using this passage in his infamous Birds of Prey
aphorism to get at a completely different point than I am, I still find it helpful in
terms of understanding the inherent seduction of language:

A quantum of force is simply such a quantum of drive,
will, action—rather, it is nothing but this very driving,
willing, acting itself—and it cannot appear as anything
else except through the seduction of language (and
the fundamental errors of reason petrified in it), which
understands and misunderstands all action as
conditioned by something which causes actions, by a
“Subject.” (On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche)

Because we are able, and almost forced, to perceive actions as dealt out by
individuals, or “Subjects,” we must understand this action through the seduction
of language. This seduction of language, though Nietzsche paints it as solely
superfluous and irrelevant to driving, willing, or acting, is how we are able to
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perceive these acts as positive or negative. This seduction is why we are able to
smile at a surprising compliment, put the amorphous organic reality of love into
words, conceive of abstract family, make compelling arguments within essays, or
even blush at a dialogue given by a significant other. Without language there
would be no romantic hue to actions and there would be no form in which to
discuss the role of narratives within our own lives. With that being said, this
obviously does not free us from the more violent aspects of language, nor
remove the imperative to explore these aspects and implications.
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Our Imperatives
Though the notion itself is seemingly strange, I assert that with the
imperative to avoid more extreme cases of symbolic violence, we must be
pushed to incrementally change both the conscious and unconscious states that
can arise within our mind. As we saw with Gazzaniga’s split-brain patient there is
some sort of tendency for narratives and thoughts to just “arise” without even
willing them. As we saw, this was not only present in a neuroscientific analysis of
running consciousness, but also within Nietzsche’s explanation of it as well; no
matter what field we use to approach the questions surrounding narratives, there
are implied imperatives present – change the neural correlates that give arise to
affects, change the verbal constructs that can arise violently, and in turn change
the narratives that can arise with said affects and constructs and vice versa.
What is evident is that we cannot avoid these imperatives, for even if we are to
grant that these narratives and immediate perceptions can arise without the “I”
willing them, we still cannot shirk the responsibility that comes with the gaze that
looks out. As Libet notes, “we may view voluntary acts as beginning with
unconscious initiatives being ‘bubbled up’ by the brain. The conscious will would
then select which of these initiatives may go forward to an action, or which ones
to veto and abort so no motor action occurs” (Libet 139).
With our presumed ability to color every perception that arises within the
brain (even if we grant that said perception is out of our immediate control) we
can now see where the responsibility lies on a personal basis. There is
seemingly a natural imperative to analyze both the perception and the narrative
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that follows in order to see its potential accordance with the narratives that
surrounds us. With this accordance to various narratives (or lack thereof) comes
an urge to work within our own narratives in order to change them, leaving open
the possibility that the next time the perception arises, a different narrative will
follow, perhaps filling in the gaps of discordance amongst relevant narratives. It is
worth noting that this sense of dissonance and discordance found within the
various narratives and metanarratives that make up the perception of our lives, is
exactly where I assert that the ethical imperative lies. It is not the ethical
imperative that drives the feedback loops present in our lives, but instead it is the
feedback loops that create the urgency of the ethical imperative of clarifying our
own narratives.
For example, upon arrival at Regis, my running narrative of everything
having reductionist and deterministic roots constrained the thoughts that could
arise with new information. Because of these foundations, I was unable to
entertain deeper ideals of value, emergence, and perception without just jumping
to the reductionist interpretation and calling it all malarkey. This was so for a
couple of reasons. The main reason was the overarching narrative of social
relations. I was constantly surrounded by students and teachers providing
different narratives, that caused me, in an unconscious attempt to play into the
narrative surrounding social cooperation, to entertain and attempt to harmonize
with my own, even if I didn’t seem to agree with them. Because I have steadily
been able to form and shift the thoughts that arise in my mind (upon notice of
seeming discordance with the narratives around me), I am left with a much more
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open perception of new ideas, leaving me able to more fairly and more
comprehensively bring different notions into conversation with each other. With
that being said, we must keep in check not only the narratives that we perceive
but also the constructs used within these narratives. Knowing all too well that
every single construct that is used within the running narrative of our mind entails
the same implications of the word “gold” in Zizek’s example, or Lolita in
Nabakov’s, we can take a much more aware and meticulous approach to the
problems that are inherent in the mere act of language or consciousness.
Now that we have a clear understanding of what language itself does to a
person or a construct, we must ask what it does in terms of one’s free-will. When
one is used in a narrative, fiction or consciousness, there is a sense of
constriction that is implied without any consent by the one being spoken about.
This constriction is metaphysically confining the person into all of the things that
are implied with the name itself. By constricting that person themselves, we are
inadvertently taking away the extent to which this person can enact their own will.
Though, as argued before, the will is incremental, there is still reduction
in this will when one can be restricted into a construct without even knowing
about it (Thus X will never compose the immortal music that would clash with the
second rate symphonies he has accustomed us to. Y will never commit murder.
Under no circumstances can Z ever betray us…) (Nabokov 265). So what can
we do? As mentioned above, there is a conscious screening effort that must take
place; but what exactly is this screening method supposed to do, and how does it
affect the brain? If we are to take the notion of emergence seriously, and grant it
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the attribute that it can in fact interact with the neural correlates beneath it, we
can start to see how this view of incremental will is starting to make sense on
both a philosophical and neuroscientific approach. When one changes the
conscious state that is invoked when a construct is used or when a situation
occurs outside of them, this, purportedly, will have downward causal effect on the
neurons beneath the emergent state of consciousness. If we grant that this
emergent interaction is both realistic and causal, then we are able to infer that
this causality would evoke a change in the neuronal connections that lie as
constituents within this emergent state. If this is the case, then the old adage that
“neurons that fire together, wire together” is extremely pertinent to what exactly
this incremental will looks like. Because the emergent state will cause neurons to
either fire or stop firing in a certain pattern, this will in fact change how they are
wired together (either strengthen/weaken the connections between them). With a
different wiring of the neurons that give rise to the emergent effect that we are
calling consciousness, we can venture to say that this different wiring will give
rise to a novel emergent state of consciousness. At this point, anyone particularly
familiar with different types of psychological therapies will notice that this is
perfectly aligned with Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, a therapy that has been
used to treat psychological ailments from depression, bipolar disorder, and
anxiety all the way to PTSD (INSERM). All of this to say, Nietzsche’s view of the
incremental will not only has moral implications in terms of how we construct
narratives and thoughts, but also aligns quite well with contemporary
neuroscientific explanations as to how neurons interact with each other, and
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even some conceptions of the will (Gazzaniga). With this in mind, we are able to
enact incremental will on a daily basis in order to offer ourselves a sort of microCognitive Behavioral Therapy, one which will not necessarily be aimed at curing
mental ailments, but instead directed at shaping what we deem as the self on a
incremental basis.
Though it is assumed quite often that the realms of neuroscience,
philosophy, linguistics, and the humanities have only little overlap in areas that
most see as quite trivial in the big scheme of things, I assert that this analysis
regarding narrative, incremental will, linguistic constructs, and imperative gives a
strong counter argument to this notion. For example, if one were to never give a
philosophical reading to the notion of language as violence, there is the chance
that they would never give thought to the implications behind the constructs we
use in terms of the incremental will, and then would never think differently in
order to be different. The philosophical analysis leads to the linguistic analysis,
the linguistic analysis leads to the psychological introspection, and finally the
psychological introspection leads to a change in the neuronal correlates. If we
can use this example as a sort of groundwork in which supposedly different
realms can interact in order to create ideas much larger than themselves, then
and only then can we keep creating cross-field ideas that are relevant to all of
society. One large question is left: Although we might realize our own
discordance and work towards a more well informed view of the narratives that
form our lives, how might we best urge those that are set in their own ways to
question and prod their own running narratives? How can we lead them to
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question the meta-narrative(s) that can form all that is below it/them in order to
maybe urge the realization of the importance of combining all of these fields?
This question and the urgency that follows from it is exactly where I hope to head
with further research. While I have a slight idea that the answer lies within the
exposure of children to dissonance within their earlier years, this thesis is not the
place to expand on the question, but instead to pose it in order to hopefully
approach it more deeply in years to follow.
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A Final Look back
At the beginning of this thesis I set out to accomplish four goals: 1) To
adequately and fairly bring in viewpoints across the spectrums of multiple fields.
2) To showcase the importance and fruitfulness of bringing in fields that are
normally seen as dichotomous on the subject at hand. 3) To walk away with not
an answer, but a more well informed viewpoint on the subject, leaving me more
conscious of the implications of my actions upon this world. 4) To leave with a
question worth following up on after the “conclusion” of my thesis. In my eyes, all
of these goals have been accomplished in multiple ways: Linguists, philosophers,
psychologists, authors, poets, and neuroscientists have been brought into
conversation with each other in order to yield not a conclusion, but a more well
informed and parallel realm of creation in which to ask questions and seek
answers. I can walk away from this thesis with a more keen awareness in the
ways in which I utilize language and narratives, all too aware of the implications
that each have both on my own consciousness and others’ consciousness. With
this more honed awareness, I am now left able to explore more honestly how I
ought to convince others of the fruitfulness of welcoming more realms of thought
into their own, yielding a community that is not only more open to different ideas,
but also more comprehensive with their own.
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Figure 1. This figure explores the various ties in relationships and actions that are
present in Nabokov’s Lolita.

